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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to model the interaction between the targets of the current
CAP: environmental adaptation, subsidies and eﬃciency the of animal farming. To this
end we ﬁrst have to identify the production frontier and relative eﬃciency level for each
animal oriented type of farm in the sample. The production frontier and eﬃciency index
for each type of farm (assuming no speciﬁc production functions) are identiﬁed using
DEA techniques. We then address the relationship between relative eﬃciency, farm size
and environmentally friendly behavior realizing a non parametric regression of eﬃciency
on economic size, a proxy for the degree of environmental appropriateness, and regional
dummies. Calculations of the eﬃciency of the farms including direct subsidies, are
compared with the counterfactual exercise in the case where direct subsidies are not
considered. Finally, we look for relations between subsidies and factors such as farm
size, eﬃciency and environmentally friendly behavior. One key result shows that on
average absolute direct payments generally tend to increase eﬃciency. However, in
most of the cases the mean eﬃciency decreases as the percentage of direct payments
rises. Direct payments are found to be positively related to environmentally friendly
production, at least in Germany. However, in general, the direct payment system is not
suﬃcient to oﬀset the fact that the less environmentally friendly farms as well as the
larger ones are more eﬃcient.1
Keywords: Eﬃciency, subsidies, DEA, non-parametric regression, ecological farming,
natural resources.
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11 Motivation and Organization
Environmental adaptation and eﬃciency have become key issues in new European agricul-
tural policy. The recent animal epidemics (e.g., mad cow disease, foot-and-mouth disease,
bird inﬂuence) and consumer reactions have drawn attention to the need for environmental
adaptation of animal husbandry. The agreement of the Council of Ministers in June 2003
(Mid-Term Review of the Common Agricultural Politic [CAP MTR]), means a step towards
the decoupling of income from prices. Additionally, CAP MTR introduces a modulation
of the direct payment (e.g., limiting direct payments by size).2 Decoupled aid means that
in the future, the vast majority of subsidies will be paid independently of the volume of
production. According to the Commission, the key elements of the new reformed CAP are,
in a nutshell:
² a single farm payment to be made to EU farmers, independent of production; limited
coupled elements may be maintained to avoid abandonment of production,
² this payment will be linked to respect for environmental, food safety, animal and plant
health and animal welfare standards, as well as the requirement to keep all farmland
in good agricultural and environmental condition (“cross-compliance”),
² a strengthened rural development policy using more EU money,
² a reduction in direct payments (“modulation”) for lager farms to increase the budget
for the new rural development policy.
In the WTO negotiations millennium round the exporting countries of the Cairns group
asked for the total abolition of the agricultural subsidies. The Commission has successfully
argued for multi-functionality to maintain or even increase direct payments when reducing
intervention prices in the WTO negotiations. This approach should provide a tool for
promoting environmentally friendly practices in agriculture.3
Another perspective is that supporters of direct payments argue that this tool is used to
increase the eﬃciency of farms with structural problems. Critics argue that subsidies allow
farmers to continue producing below the eﬃciency frontier. Some critics, especially from
outside the EU, also argue that by allowing ineﬃcient European farmers to survive, the CAP
harms eﬃcient agriculture overseas. One of the main justiﬁcations for the direct payments to
farmers is their positive societal impact through nature and environmental conservation and
increased eﬃciency. Direct payments are deﬁned as subsidies decoupled (not linked to) from
the output level. Surprisingly few studies are available which calculate whether the 1992
2Commissioner Fischler, the European Commission staﬀ member responsible for Agriculture, Rural,
Development and Fisheries, remarked (SPEECH/03/326): “The agriculture reform has been agreed. ...
Farmers will enjoy more income stability, more freedom to produce what the market wants, and a system of
support which is much easier to justify from a social point of view. Consumers and taxpayers will receive
more for their money: more transparency, more quality, more environmental protection and animal welfare”.
3E.g. in Spain, animal farms with extensive practices (i.e. low livestock units per land area), frequently
located in mountainous areas or Mediterranean forest grazing lands, well illustrate the complementary rela-
tionship between animal farming and landscape preservation.
2CAP reform increases in the level of direct payments were followed by a rise in eﬃciency,
especially for the environmentally friendly farms. This could actually politically justify the
reinforcement of the status quo with minor changes. Fischler, on the other hand, strongly
warns EU farmers to become more competitive by increasing their eﬃciency: “Severing the
link between subsidies and production will make EU farmers more competitive and market
orientated”. Certainly, see ´ Alvarez (2001), eﬃciency does not automatically imply that
farms are competitive. However, at least empirically, strengthened market orientation does
not always correlate clearly with environmental conservation.
The aim of this paper is the analysis of this triangular relation between eﬃciency, environ-
mental friendliness and subsidies in the EU. More speciﬁc, we try to ﬁnd some answers on
the following chain of question.
First, it is still costly to be environmental friendly in the EU ? Note that answering this
question is a rather complex task due to endogenity problems and because the notion
of eﬃciency is ambiguous; it could mean economic eﬃciency from the farmer’s point of
view (e.g. including direct payments) or conventional technical eﬃciency (looking at the
production process without subsidies).
The second question is: How much do subsidies compensate small and environmental
friendly farms? More speciﬁcally we can study how much they improve compared to the
large environmentally unfriendly farms after, rather than before subsidies. This is equiv-
alent to revealing the impact of the direct payment system on farm eﬃciency under the
status quo farmer’s behavior.
So, to answer these questions we propose basically three steps:
In the ﬁrst step, eﬃciency is calculated taking into account the direct payment (DP) re-
ceived, calling this coeﬃcient EDP. Direct payments are deﬁned as subsidies not directly
linked to the output level. In other words, the farmer has to take decisions having in
mind that, within the farm possibilities of production, certain outputs include byproducts
(positive environmental externalities) with a direct payment as a monetary compensation
whereas others have no compensation or even a cost (environmental tax for a negative
externalities).
Afterwards, eﬃciency is computed excluding direct payments, calling this coeﬃcient EW.
The results rank farms according with the eﬃciency in a world without direct subsidies, so
neither rewards for positive externalities nor penalties for negative externalities. It might be
mentioned that the EW calculation assumes the existing input/output prices (i.e. coupled
support levels remain unchanged). For example, the eﬃciency impact of an hypothetical
variation of the intervention prices are (by intention) not considered in this exercise. It may
be emphasized that we indeed want to compare the eﬃciency with vs without DP under
the “status quo” farmer’s behavior, i.e. we want to measure the loss of eﬃciency for being
environmentally friendly.
Note that the calculation of EW, EDP is not of direct interest in our paper but serves as
an auxiliary step.
3After having calculated EDP, EW, we regress eﬃciency on environmentally friendly (EF),
and on other factors like economic size (ESU) to get rid of possible endogenity. We ﬁnd that
in general, being environmental friendly and/or small is costly, especially when looking on
EW. Also we ﬁnd strong positive interaction between size and environmental unfriendliness.
This might not be surprising, but now we can look on what the European Union was really
doing against this (the “cross-compliance” argument).
When recalling the second question it is clear that all we have to do is to take the regression
curves from the above and compare the regression of EW with the regression of EDP, i.e. for
the statistical part of this analysis we need the same steps as we need to answer the ﬁrst
above mentioned question.
Note that in this counterfactual exercise we study how eﬃcient the farms would be under
the same allocation policy but without receiving DP. This point is important to understand
because we are not interested in measuring the eﬃciency (without DP) after farms have
adapted to the new situation, e.g. haging become less environmental friendly or increased
farm size etc. Such a study would be interesting when looking at competitiveness but is
clearly beyond of the scope of this paper.
Next, the third question deals with the issue of promoting conventional eﬃciency, EW,
using direct payments. The question to answer is: Do the subsidies (at least) promote
conventional eﬃciency? Investigating this is fairly simple because due to the way we have
calculated EW, there is no problem of endogenity when looking at the linear and semi-log-
linear regression (i.e. correlation and semi-log-correlation) of EW on DP. The results are
alarming: even though eﬃciency increases weakly with absolute DP increase (not surpris-
ing), it decreases for a relative increase in DP (perhaps surprising?). One conclusion is that
it is counterproductive when DP is positively related to size.
This produces our fourth and ﬁnal question: How are the DP related to size ESU? Here
we have simply looked at diﬀerent linear and log-linear relationships between DP and
ESU. We belief that this is fair enough in our context as we are not interested in the
intentions of the European Community (as then one would have to take into account the
possible endogenity of ESU). Moreover we are interested in the absolute (direct, indirect
or spurious) relation between DP and ESU. We ﬁnd that this relation is up to 97% which
leads us to conclude that this subsidy policy is counterproductive. That correlation is
not surprising as “decoupled subsidies” in terms of direct payments are mainly based on
“per head” and “per hectare”, but not exclusively, and therefore the strength of positive
correlation is surprising.
To study these questions at the European level, we chose Spain and Germany as represen-
tatives of Continental and Mediterranean livestock raising. The paper aims to replicate
eﬃciency levels under diﬀerent policy scenarios. We use the German and the Spanish sam-
ple data from the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) from 1999 and 2000 by type
of animal farming with positive plant production. Note that more recent data, though
available, are strongly disturbed by the BSE (also called mad cows) crisis. We repeat ef-
ﬁciency calculations for two years to test for the inﬂuence of random weather variability
(e.g., pasture availability).
4For our analysis we always use nonparametric methods when parametric model (mis-
)speciﬁcation could provoke serious disturbances in our conclusions. When we speak of
model (mis-)speciﬁcation we do not refer to variable selection but to functional form speci-
ﬁcation. This greatly increases the econometric eﬀort as well as the variance of our results
but avoids any polemic about the inﬂuence of subjective modelling.
Eﬃciency is measured using an index calculated with DEA (Data Envelope Analysis), and
again with a counterfactual index ignoring the direct payments for each individual farm (for
details see Section 3.1). The counterfactual index measures the level of eﬃciency distortion
on the economic behavior of the holding because under CAP it is possible to “crop subsidies”
on the top of agricultural products. This allows us to compare relative eﬃciency with direct
subsidies included in the eﬃciency index to the case when they are eliminated in the so
called counterfactual eﬃciency calculations. In the following we always refer to EDP when
speaking of eﬃciency, and to EW when speaking of conventional eﬃciency.
The implications are important for the future application of the recently approved CAP
Reform 2003 on historical basis. Results can potentially be translated into promoting the
wrong type of farming, as in past years, e.g., the conversion of price support into direct
payments based on the past year’s level of protection (the “historical rights” argument).
2 Model and Data
Recall that we are interested in the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency, environmental conservation
and the CAP’s use of the direct payment (DP).
The DPs were originally introduced in the McSharry CAP reform to decouple income from
guarantee prices, and to control the intervention stocks. The theoretical idea behind the
introduction of direct payments is the anti-production premium which assumes that the
farm income is the result of the diﬀerence between income and cost plus the anti-production
premium. This premium should be related with the income loss due to the output reduction.
In practice direct payments were ﬁxed by area, by head of certain animal and others. This
means that in a common market organization with overproduction the Commission typically
calculates the DP to compensate farmers for an income reduction.
That policy can be reenforced through the reduction of the guarantee prices (e.g. reducing
the intervention price to approach world market prices) with the target being to eliminate
intervention stocks and to control the CAP budget by reducing intervention acquisitions
and / or export restitutions (subsidies). In fact, the total elimination of the export resti-
tutions is under negotiation in the current millennium round of the WTO (World Trade
Organization). The commission is also seeking to transform every direct payment into single
farm payments.
In practice, the real impact of guarantee price reductions on farm income depends on the
level of eﬃciency of the farm with respect to the standard level imputed by the policy
makers in the regions (NUTS2 in Eurostat jargon). Notice that the output reduction is
not directly observed. Therefore, the policy measure (i.e. the anti production premium) is
5calculated mainly based on the set-aside area and / or the number of heads per holding. On
top of that, the cross compliance criterion requires a minimum area per head (of cattle) to
qualify for a direct payments program. For this reason our environmentally friendly proxy
is livestock unit equivalents per agricultural utilized area (LU/AUA) as we want to replicate
the policy makers criteria.
The econometric task is to assess the impact of being environmentally friendly on being
eﬃcient, and to determine the relations between direct payments and other factors such
as farm economic size, environmentally friendly behavior and economic eﬃciency. Under
price intervention it is diﬃcult to assume that marginal costs equal prices as often required
in parametric production functions for inputs and outputs (i.e. under perfect competition),
even in the most ﬂexible speciﬁcations. Further, as the topic is known to be rather polemic
by nature, we prefer not to use speciﬁc parametrization for our models, i.e. neither for the
production function when calculating eﬃciency nor for the regression when estimating the
eﬀect of size and environmental friendliness on eﬃciency.4
Therefore we have decided to apply rather sophisticated nonparametric methods as other-
wise, the modelings would clearly have a direct impact on the results. Certainly, it is well
known that this, at least for moderate sample sizes, greatly complicates precise inference
(e.g. signiﬁcance testing). On the other hand, the results we see are uncorrupted in the
sense that they do not vary with the subjective model the researcher has chosen.
The producer level of direct support is measured by the total amount of direct payments
in farm accounts; size by European Size Units (ESU), and livestock unit equivalents per
agricultural utilized area (LU/AUA) as a proxy for measuring how environmentally friendly
the farm is, see discussion above. In contrast, the output eﬃciency cannot be directly
observed and will have to be calculated in a ﬁrst step by DEA, see also Section 3.1.
Our variables to calculate eﬃciency of production are the following5:
4As a referee noticed, the eﬀect of size on eﬃciency could also be studied by other methods, e.g. though
the measurement of scale eﬃciency, see Førsund (1996) or Banker, Cooper, Seiford, and Zhu (2004).
5We always have used nominal prices and real quantities accounted by the farmers as given in FADN. It
could be discussed to use world market prices instead, but 1. it is very diﬃcult to calculate new output and
input levels for each individual farm under world market conditions. Therefore eﬃciency measures would be
biased by assumptions on world market prices. 2. It is beyond the scope of this paper to study the eﬃciency
under diﬀerent trade liberalization scenarios.
6OUTPUT Qv plant output
Qa animal output
INPUT Kf farm capital, mainly buildings and machinery at present value
Ca fodder and other animal linked inputs
Cv crop linked inputs (fertilizer, agro-chemicals, seeds, water
and other crop speciﬁc inputs, fuels and lubricants)
W wages
AUA = Agricultural Utilized Area of farm aggregate adjusted by quality
AI+ANI (including pasture, arable land and permanent crops adjusted
by quality, i.e. geographical situation and if irrigated or not)
SP “shadow price” / opportunity costs
for producing in a non-subsidized way
The livestock is considered in the farmer’s output because output is deﬁned here by stock
variation and sales, for details see MCKay, Lawrence, and Vlastuin (1983). In total, ﬁve
inputs can be used plus SP. The so called “shadow price” (SP) is calculated from direct
payments (including premiums) with a negative sign, therefore we set SP= ¡DP.
The present value of Kf is calculated by departing from the acquisition price and inputting
a technical amortization by average life of every type of asset (building or machinery and
transport vehicles, for details see Ball et al., 2004). This excludes the livestock units and
the land area.
When we say “adjusted by quality”, this means that we have calculated the value of input
“land” for Spain as follows:
land value = AI ¤ PI + ANI ¤ PNI; (1)
where AI: Agricultural Utilized Area (AUA) irrigated (Ha.); ANI: AUA non-irrigated
(Ha.); PI: price AUA irrigated by region (Euros/Ha); PNI: price AUA non-irrigated by
region (Euros/Ha). The average price by region is a weighted average of the irrigated and
non irrigated diﬀerent type of lands in the region (e.g. grass land divided in two quality
levels, plus arable land, greenhouses, permanent crops (by type of tree: fruits other than
citruses, citruses, vinegars, olive) see for details Decimavilla and San Juan (2002). For
Germany we took the total of AUA as the diﬀerentiation of irrigated and non irrigated land
does not make much sense.
There are three things that might cause curiosity: why we do not aggregate the two outputs,
why we include SP as input instead of considering DP as a third output, and why we have
not aggregated more (or less) on the input side. The reasoning for this comes immediately
from the DEA method so we have postponed this discussion until the end of Section 3.1.
Having the eﬃciency at hand, we use a regression model to study the level of compatibil-
ity between diﬀerent targets of the new CAP, including environmental conservation and
competitiveness at the farm level.
We want to measure the impact of being environmentally friendly by ﬁltering out the re-
gional and size eﬀects. As indicated before the increase in consumer demand for more
7environmentally friendly products on the one hand, and the justiﬁcation of the incentives
paid under CAP on the other hand, have made “being environmentally friendly” an impor-
tant issue of output eﬃciency.
Beyond the objective of more market oriented agriculture, the new CAP uses eﬃciency as
a key factor. Therefore we estimated the following model [in EUR]
E = g[ln(EF);ln(ESU)] + ¯TR + e ; (2)
where E is eﬃciency, EF indicates the environmentally friendly degree proxy measure,
ESU is the European Size Unit, and R is a vector of dummy variables for agricultural
regions divided in to North, Center, Northeast, South and East for Spain, and North,
Center, South and East for Germany respectively. Farm location is reported at a general
agricultural regional level, a geographical unit that includes several provinces (in Spain) or
L¨ ander (in Germany). Therefore, in the non-parametric model we use location parameters
to control for possible diﬀerent regional endowments. The aggregation by large agrarian
regions of Spain is based on the geographical specialization reported by Mora and San Juan
(2003). The aggregation of the LU is made with the standard procedure used by FADN
and EUROSTAT. The variables come from the individual accounting collected under FADN
normalization. The detailed input and output information of each farm account is fully
utilized to calculate the aggregate variables that include all production costs.
The function g : <2 ! < is not speciﬁed further because the impact of ln(EF) and
ln(ESU) turned out to be nonlinear and to have (strong) interaction. Finally, the “error”
term e stands for the not further speciﬁed heterogeneity. As g(¢;¢) is non-parametric, we
could have directly used the co-variates ESU and EF in the model (2). The logarithm
does, therefore, not impose any model speciﬁcation here. This variable transformation is
only due to smoothing necessities, see Section 3.2.
As we analyze here the subvention policy, for a fair evaluation we have to choose the same
measure which the European Community applies, i.e. Livestock Units per Agricultural
Utilized Area, i.e. LU/UAA (see discussion in the introduction). The LU/UAA indicator is
an indicator highly related to other environmental amenities of the farm such us untouched
landscape, traditional buildings, wild animal habitats, bio-diversity, preservation of the
regional non intensive productive (endemic) livestock types, and shows the potential of
grazing feed of the livestock, usually negative related to feedstuﬀ consumption. Under the
current CAP regulation (since year 1993) the farms must present a minimum LU/AUA to
qualify for DP. For that reason some farms in our sample show no DP, but it could also
happen that the farm does not have subsidies for other reasons (or some products do not
have DP speciﬁc programs but some farms can be engaged in other environmental programs
that provide subsidies to improve environmental behavior in that case DP are included).
Table 1 gives the DP distribution by type of animal and country.
Note that the smaller EF is, the more “environmentally friendly” the farm is. Note further
that deﬁning EF by LU/(land value) does not change the overall ﬁnal results.
All variables are taken from FADN, except land prices which come from the Agricultural
Land Prices Survey for Spain (Encuesta de precios de la Tierra (Base 1997), Boletin Mensual
8Spain
numbers percentages
Type n Year 1999 2000 1999 2000
Cattle 996 1313 69.408 85.094
Sheep & Goats 553 679 100 100
Pig Farming 233 232 91.373 93.173
Poultry 24 26 80.000 81.250
Total 1847 2288 79.750 89.937
Germany
numbers percentages
Type n Year 1999 2000 1999 2000
Cattle 353 358 97.245 98.623
Pig Farming 245 245 100 100
Total 598 603 98.355 99.178
Table 1: Numbers and percentages of farms with DP per country and year.
de Estadistica Agraria, November 2002). For Germany we use land rents derived from the
rental prices of rented land; in cases of missing values we have used the regional average
derived from the underlying sample.
We selected farms oriented to animal production, i.e. farms with larger animal than vegetal
output in both years. To include only farms with similar production functions and with the
possibility of cropping plant products for re-use on the farm or for sale, we selected only
farms with both positive animal and plant production. We believe that farms without land
have a non-comparable production function and will therefore be excluded, e.g. think of
fattering farms.
For our analysis, the sample is split by country (Germany and Spain), and by type of
animal farming (cattle farming, pig farming and sheep and goats) as these diﬀerent farm
types are neither uniform in the treatment by CAP nor in the production process. So we
did all calculations separately for each year, country and farm type. As mentioned earlier,
for comparison reasons we will determine an eﬃciency index with [EDP] and without [EW]
direct payments.
We use data from the sample in Spain and Germany (years 1999–2000) of the Farm Account-
ing Data Network (FADN). Every year, the survey gathers information on the characteristics
of the farm (AUA, LU, type of livestock and crops, economic size of the farm, ...) and nom-
inal production (animal and crop output) for a representative sample of holdings at the
regional level in Germany and Spain. Unfortunately, for Germany, information on sheep
and goats is only available for very few farms, thus a statistical analysis is not sensible.
The same FADN survey also provides detailed information on input expenditures by farm.
As mentioned above, for the selected farms, the livestock production is always greater than
plant output (fodder, ﬁeld crop, grain cereals, vineyards, potatoes, industrial crops, plants,
9fruits, dried pulses, olive groves and others). Table 2 summarizes the number of farms that
are used for all the calculations, separated by year, animal type and country.
Year 099 000
sheep and goats 553 679
Spain cattle 1435 1543
pig 255 249
Germany cattle 604 604
pig 355 355
Table 2: Number of farms that are used for all our calculations.
3 Methodologies
Even though these methodologies are not completely new, many readers might not be
familiar with DEA or with nonparametric regression. Therefore we oﬀer here a brief insight
for a better understanding and interpretation of the results presented later.
3.1 Estimation of Eﬃciency
Since we do not want our results and conclusions to be dependent on a particular speci-
ﬁcation of the production function, we have chosen the DEA method. Data envelopment
analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric approach using linear programming methods to de-
termine the envelopment of the DMUs (decision making units) thus identifying “the best
practice” for each productive unit.
Then, measures are calculated relative to this frontier for each individual Debreu-Farrell
eﬃciency (see Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000), for a comprehensive description of the
methodology). The main advantage of DEA is that there is no need to specify a particular
functional form for the production frontier, though the assumption that there is no random
error might be seen as a drawback. However, excluding measurement errors, this question
depends only on the deﬁnition of “eﬃciency”.
Let us deﬁne some basic concepts of non-parametric eﬃciency measurement. Let x 2 <p
and y 2 <
q
+ denote input and output vectors, respectively, with which we may deﬁne the
following set of the feasible input-output combination,
Ψ = f(x;y) 2 <p+q : x can produce yg: (3)
For any y 2 <
q
+ we may deﬁne the previous set by the input requirement set deﬁned as
X(y) = fx 2 <p : (x;y) 2 Ψg; (4)
where the input eﬃcient frontier may be deﬁned by the following isoquant:
±X(y) = fx 2 X(y) : µx = 2 X(y) 8µ < 1g; (5)
10and therefore, the corresponding Farrell input-oriented measure of eﬃciency (Farrell, 1957)
is speciﬁed as the following distance function6:
µ(x;y) = inffµ : µx 2 X(y)g : (7)
So µ(x;y) deﬁnes the input eﬃciency (the maximum contraction) along a ﬁxed ray away
from the eﬃcient input. E.g. a value of µ(x;y) = 1 means that the producer is input eﬃcient
while a value of µ(x;y) < 1 indicates that the producer is input ineﬃcient and he may reduce
inputs in that proportion while maintaining the output level.
Alternatively, one could formulate (5) to (7) as an output oriented problem. In practice,
the input orientated is more popular due to its easier interpretation, e.g. it corresponds to
the idea of cost eﬃciency. However, as a referee pointed out, in particular the inclusion of
SP= ¡DP would make the output orientated DEA version more intuitive as a farmer is not
interested in minimizing / reducing the direct subsidies received. However, the contrary
argument would hold for many of the other inputs when choosing an output orientated
DEA. The interpretation in an input orientated DEA would not be that the farmer with an
index E < 1 is interested in reducing DP (by factor E), but that he could reach the same
output level with less DP and is therefore ineﬃcient at the present state. Nevertheless, we
repeated some of the calculations with the output orientated DEA, that certainly suﬀers
to some extend similar criticism as the input orientated one. In the Appendix we give
for the Spanish data histogram plots of the EDP and EW for 1999 and 2000 when the
indices are calculated with an input orientated DEA, and histograms of the diﬀerences of
the input minus the output orientated EDP. As can be seen, the diﬀerences are minor (but
for pig farms an output orientated DEA even discriminates the farms somewhat more). Not
surprisingly, the ﬁnal conclusions turn out to be the same.
Further alternatives are e.g. DEA-methodologies that allow combining both minimizing
input and maximizing output, see Gonz´ alez Fidalgo (2001) or Banker, Cooper, Seiford,
and Zhu (2004). On the other hand these method also needs several assumptions that not
necessarily meet in our context as for example in Gonz´ alez Fidalgo (2001) minimizing input
and maximizing output is restricted to occur always in the same proportion. Finally, DEA
also allows for ﬁxing some of the input, respectively output factors, see Banker and Morey
(1986), but we found this does not ﬁt to our case because all input factors can be potentially
changed by the farmer’s decision, e.g. additional land could be rented.
For the rest of the paper we therefore concentrate on the presentation of the numerical
results based on the input orientated DEA. The estimation of this, above deﬁned concept
requires some assumptions (see F¨ are, Grosskopf and Lovell, 1994) for both the production
possibility set (mainly convexity and free disposability of inputs and outputs) and the
distance function. The ﬁrst model proposed under the methodology called DEA (Charnes,
Cooper and Rhodes, 1978) was deﬁned under constant returns to scale, but later papers
have considered alternative sets of assumptions such the case of variable returns to scale by
6Equivalently, Farrell’s input eﬃciency may be described by the Shephard input distance function
±(x;y) = (µ(x;y))




11Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). In any case, and under some regularity assumptions
on the data generating process speciﬁed in Kneip, Park and Simar (1998), DEA allows
consistent estimation of the above concepts (see Simar and Wilson (2000) for a review of
the DEA statistical properties).
For a sample of n producers, the DEA estimate of the production set (b Ψ) under the least
restrictive returns to scale assumption (i.e. variable returns) is:









°i = 1; 8°i ¸ 0g; (8)
where °i is the intensity vector of ﬁrm i and deﬁnes its best practice or benchmark ﬁrm by a
linear combination of all the ﬁrms observed in the sample. Constraint
Pn
i=1 °i = 1 imposes
variable returns to scale into the benchmark technology while the two ﬁrst constraints in
the equation (8) imply that an excess of outputs or inputs can be disposed of freely.
The DEA estimates of equations (4) and (5) are then
ˆ X(y) = fx 2 <p j (x;y) 2 ˆ Ψg; (9)
± ˆ X(y) = fx 2 ˆ X(y) j µx = 2 ˆ X(y) ; 8µ < 1g; (10)
while the estimation of the Farrell (technical) eﬃciency measure, see Farrell (1957), is
computed by linear programming techniques as follows:
ˆ µ(xj;yj) = minfµ :
n X
i=1






°i = 1 ; 8°i ¸ 0g: (11)
Since by construction ˆ Ã µ Ã, the estimator ˆ µ(xj;yj) constitutes a downward-biased estima-
tor of µ(xj;yj). The analyzed ﬁrm j is technically eﬃcient if and only if ˆ µ(xj;yj) = 1 and it
is placed on the estimated frontier while a value such as ˆ µ(xj;yj) < 1 means that the ﬁrm
is ineﬃcient.
We conclude with three remarks that can now be understood better:
As animal and plant outputs cannot be easily substituted, we must not aggregate them,
instead, we consider the calculation of eﬃciency as a two dimensional output problem.
As already indicated above, including SP, representing the costs paid for not producing in a
subsidized manner can also be understood as including direct payments as negative inputs.
There are two reasons why we preferred not to consider them as a third output: on the one
hand, the production factors considered here do not (directly) produce DP, so there is no
reasonable argument for allowing them to appear on the left hand side of the production
function; on the other hand, many farms in Spain have zero subsidies and would thus form a
non-interpretable hyper-plane in the DEA. Nevertheless we admit that handling DP in the
model as input subsidy or output related subsidy is a crucial point; both approaches could
be applied. The “Global Trade Analysis Project” (known as GTAP), for example, handles
DP as subsidies on inputs. The main part of DP in the EU is linked to land (even headage
premia on beef cattle are linked via livestock density restrictions). Therefore it seems
worthwhile to handle DP as input subsidy. For the other option (handling DP as output),
12DP level could increase for a constant level on inputs (e.g. land), which is contradictory to
CAP regulations.
Finally, it could be argued as to whether more input variables should be aggregated for a
non-parametric analysis such as DEA, e.g. to obtain stronger results with respect to larger
diﬀerences in the resulting eﬃciency index. However, this question is nothing more than
a discussion of the bias – variance trade oﬀ dilemma: more aggregating leads to more
bias but less variance and vice versa. We have decided here to opt for high resolution,
i.e. high variance, small bias. So, since we always conduct non-parametric analysis with
high resolution level, none of our results will suﬀer errors due to possible misspeciﬁcation.
3.2 Regression Analysis
Next, we are interested in estimating model (2). As mentioned above we do not want to
assume any particular functional form on g(¢;¢) except that it is a smooth function, i.e. it
has continuous second derivatives.
We will now present a brief insight into the algorithms of non-parametric ﬂexible function
regression. In particular we explain the estimation of the parameters ¯ and its asymptotic
covariance, as well as the estimation of the non-parametric function of g(¢;¢) in a semipara-
metric model of the form as described in equation (2). We assume E[ejEF;ESU;R] = 0,
V ar[e] < 1. The estimation of g(¢) and ¯ will be made in two steps: ﬁrst the estimation
of ¯ and its covariance using the method of Robinson (1988), and afterwards the estimation
of g(¢;¢) using local linear smoothing by Ruppert and Wand (1994). For a more detailed
introduction to non- and semi-parametric modeling see also H¨ ardle, M¨ uller, Sperlich, and
Werwatz (2004).
The basic idea is to construct an estimator that creates a smooth surface (or hyper-plane),
e.g. in the one dimensional case a smooth line, into the point cloud that presents its func-
tional form. The smoothness of that surface can be (pre-) determined by choosing a respec-
tively large smoothing parameter h, called bandwidth. Actually, this parameter can often
also be data driven.
First, it is important to understand that this estimator works locally, e.g. we estimate the
desired function, the hyper-plane, separately at each point we are interested in. Therefore
we need to introduce some additional notations. Consider for a moment a regression problem
of the form E[Y jX = x0] = G(x0), Y 2 < ,X;x 2 <d with G(¢) : <d ! < being an unknown
smoothing function. Imagine we aim to estimate G(x0) for some point x0 2 <d. Having
fXi;Yign










Yi ¡ a0 ¡ aT
1 (Xi ¡ x0)
ª2
Kh(Xi ¡ x0) ; (12)






h ) is a
<d ! < weight function. In our calculations we chose K(v) = 15
16(1¡v2)21 1fjvj · 1g. So we
used a weighted least squares estimator for linear regression that becomes a local (linear)
estimator due to the weights Kh giving a lot of weight to points (Xi;Yi) where Xi is close
13to x0 but zero weights to points far from x0. Consistency, asymptotic theory and properties
are well known and studied for the multivariate case in Ruppert and Wand (1994), for a
general introduction see Fan and Gijbels (1996).
If we eliminate in equation (12) the vector a1 and thus maximize only over a0, the




i=1 Kh(Xi ¡ x0)Yi Pn
i=1 Kh(Xi ¡ x0)
: (13)
As one can see, in the weighting function, the smoothing parameter h comes in: the larger
the h, and consequently the environment with positive weighting, the smoother the resulting
hyper-plane, i.e. h ! 1 gives a linear function for G whereas h = 0 yields a G being the
interpolation of the Yi’s. In a context like ours, the choice of the smoothing parameter
should be considered in the same way as choice of degrees of freedom, i.e. the empirical
researcher would allow for more ﬂexibility or impose more smoothness on its functions. To
allow for high ﬂexibility without increasing the variance to unreasonable levels, we chose
smoothing parameters that did not restrict the functional forms unless the plotted surface
became wiggly.
Returning back to our model (2), we will apply the local linear estimation method, i.e. equa-
tion (12), on fWi := (ln(EFi);ln(ESUi));(Ei ¡ ˆ ¯Ri)gn
i=1. The remaining question is how
to obtain ˆ ¯. The estimator of ¯ is deﬁned as
ˆ ¯ = S¡1
R¡ ˜ R;R¡ ˜ RSR¡ ˜ R;E¡ ˜ E (14)




i and ˜ Ri =
b E[RijWi], ˜ Bi = b E[BijWi] with Bi being either Ri or Ei. We estimate the conditional
expectations ( b E) via local constant smoother as deﬁned in the equation (13). It is easy
to see that the variance of ˆ ¯ can be estimated by ˆ ¾2S¡1
R¡ ˜ R;R¡ ˜ R with ˆ ¾2 being a consistent
estimator of the conditional variance of E: ¾2 = V ar[EjWi;Ri]. For more details see
Robinson (1988). Note that all these models have been proved to work perfectly also for
dependent data. It is worthwhile to mention this as the indices calculated by DEA are not
independent.
Certainly, as g(¢;¢) is non-parametric, we could have directly used the co-variates ESU
and EF in the model (2). As mentioned above, the logarithm does therefore not impose
any model speciﬁcation here. The problem is that both variables have a rather skewed
distribution with many data-sparse areas. In contrast, ln(ESU) as well as ln(EF) look
quite normal around the mode with rather short tails at the end. It is thus only for the sake
of reasonable behavior of our smoothing techniques that we prefer to apply our smoothing
methods on the log-transformed data, see also Biedermann and Dette (2003) for more
details.
4 Empirical Results
All above mentioned calculations have been realized separately for Spain for 1999, 2000 for
cattle, pig, sheep and goat farms; for Germany for 1999, 2000 for cattle and pig farms. The
14presentation and discussion of results follows the reasoning and list of questions given in
the ﬁrst section. This includes: estimation of our models in equation (2) to analyze the
impact of environmentally friendly behavior and farm size on eﬃciency for 1999 and 2000;
comparison of regression results based on EW with those based on EDP; calculating the
correlations between subsidies and other factors such as farm economic size, environmentally
friendly behavior and economic eﬃciency; where appropriate, we use and compare results
of both calculations for further conclusions.
As the calculation of eﬃciency alone is not of interest in this article, but only an auxiliary
step (see ﬁrst section), we will neither explicitly give nor discuss the results of the DEA
calculations here but have deferred them to the Appendix. Instead, we start directly with
the analysis of the impact of environmentally friendly behavior and farm size on eﬃciency.
That is, we focus on the regression problem of equation
E = g[ln(EF);ln(ESU)] + ¯TR + e ;
for E being EDP (DP included in model) as well as for E being EW (DP not included in
model). By comparing eﬃciency calculated with direct payments included (EDP) and the
resulting eﬃciency when subsidies are ignored (EW), we checked if and how the CAP policy
distorts eﬃciency. The estimation procedures applied here have been explained in detail
in Section 3.2. When we speak of signiﬁcance in the following, we always refer to the 10%
signiﬁcance level.
In non- and semi-parametric regression, the choice of smoothness controlled via the band-
width (named h in Section 3.2) and chosen by the empirical researcher, is often either not
discussed or quite polemic. Therefore, we tried out several bandwidths and present here the
results for those where the estimated surface starts to become smooth. In practice, for two
dimensions and smooth densities as we have in this application, this provides a reasonable
trade-oﬀ between bias and variance of the estimates. For the parametric part ¯ of model
(2) it should be emphasized that the results for the (semi-) parametric estimation of the
regional dummies turned out to be quite robust with respect to the bandwidth choice for the
non-parametric part. This is expected if e.g. the regional dummies are almost uncorrelated
with the other covariates ln(ESU) and ln(EF).
First let us make some remarks on the results concerning the regional dummies, i.e. on ˆ ¯,
summarized in Table 3 for Spain in 1999 and 2000. We divided Spain into 5 regions: North,
Center, Andalusia, Ebro (along the Ebro river), and Levante. The last one has been used
as a normalizing region. Note that Andalusia could be replaced by “South”, and Levante
by “East”. Ebro represents the northeastern Spanish region including the northeastern
Mediterranean coast and the Ebro river valley with a mainly Mediterranean climate that
traditionally has been considered as a homogenous agricultural region.
Surprisingly, the North and Ebro seem to be less eﬃcient. However, these results are only
signiﬁcant for cattle farming, whereas the Ebro is only signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient than the
other regions when considering sheep and goats. For cattle farming, Levante seems to be
best even though not signiﬁcantly better than the center and the south. These ﬁndings
hardly change with the dependent variable, being EDP and its counterfactual opposite EW.
15year dep. var. North Center Andalusia Ebro
Cattle
1999 EDP -0.4617 -0.2189 -0.3761 -0.4907
0.10397 0.10400 0.11497 0.10549
EW -0.4672 -0.2537 -0.3298 -0.5062
0.10214 0.10217 0.11295 0.10364
2000 EDP -0.4192 -0.1790 -0.3592 -0.4065
0.08852 0.08943 0.10014 0.09058
EW -0.4233 -0.2001 -0.3419 -0.4030
0.08752 0.08842 0.09901 0.08955
Pig
1999 EDP -0.3459 -0.0607 0.08320 -0.0926
0.15810 0.04511 0.08340 0.03744
EW -0.2148 -0.0158 0.12308 -0.0410
0.15722 0.04486 0.08294 0.03723
2000 EDP -0.0329 -0.0160 0.20771 -0.0460
0.11033 0.05789 0.09105 0.04707
EW -0.0948 -0.0195 0.05673 -0.0431
0.10395 0.05454 0.08578 0.04434
Sheep and Goats
1999 EDP -0.1201 -0.0228 -0.0901 -0.1380
0.06367 0.04137 0.05517 0.04526
EW -0.1459 -0.0326 -0.0989 -0.1851
0.05864 0.03811 0.05081 0.04168
2000 EDP -0.1049 -0.0726 -0.2321 -0.2156
0.05082 0.03033 0.03679 0.03437
EW -0.0969 -0.0667 -0.2181 -0.2632
0.04845 0.02891 0.03506 0.03276
Table 3: Estimates (upper lines) with standard error (lower lines) for the regional dummies
“¯” in model (2) for Spain.
In Table 4 the corresponding results for Germany are given, also for 1999 and 2000, but
without sheep and goat farms. We divided Germany in to only four regions: North, Center,
South, and East. Again, the latter has been used as a normalizing region.
In Germany, the south is the most eﬃcient in cattle farming whereas it is hard to say
something about diﬀerences in the rest of the country. It may be that central Germany is
more eﬃcient than the east and north, but this is not signiﬁcant for 2000. In pig farming,
the most eﬃcient farms are the (quite large) ones in Eastern Germany. However, signiﬁcance
changes with year and the dependent variable, EDP or EW.
Much more interesting for us is the outcome of the impact estimates for environmentally
16year dep. var. North Center South
Cattle
1999 EDP -0.0279 0.02466 0.07394
0.02255 0.02271 0.02350
EW -0.0261 0.03302 0.08543
0.02310 0.02327 0.02407
2000 EDP 0.01820 0.05785 0.08961
0.02208 0.02235 0.02322
EW 0.02153 0.06496 0.09295
0.02199 0.02226 0.02313
Pig
1999 EDP -0.0787 -0.0657 -0.0272
0.05942 0.06424 0.06067
EW -0.1328 -0.1073 -0.0860
0.05821 0.06294 0.05944
2000 EDP -0.1331 -0.0989 -0.0765
0.06012 0.06545 0.06171
EW -0.2057 -0.1580 -0.1574
0.05955 0.06483 0.06113
Table 4: Estimates (upper lines) with standard error (lower lines) for the regional dummies
“¯” in model (2) for Germany.
friendly behavior (EF) and farm size (ESU) on (conventional) eﬃciency. As the functional
form of g(¢;¢) in model (2) is non-parametric, the results are given graphically, see Figures
1 to 10. Here, only the graphs for 2000 are shown, the graphs for 1999 are available on page
www.uc3m.es/uc3m/dpto/CJM/webmonnet.html or upon request.
In all the graphs shown, the outer 2% boundaries are cut oﬀ (i.e. not plotted) to avoid
interpreting the so called boundary eﬀects typical in nonparametric estimation. Since the
g(¢;¢) function is an unknown function from <2 to <, it is presented via two graphs: a three
dimensional and a two dimensional one. The two dimensional one shows three functions rep-
resenting the three slices of the full (i.e. three) dimensional plot that describe the impact of
the environmentally friendly behavior proxy (lnEF) on eﬃciency when farm size (lnESU)
is ﬁxed at: the median (solid line), the upper 95% quantile, i.e. large farms (dotted line),
and at the lower 5% quantile, i.e. small farms (dashed line).
Our results show that:
In general one can say that the distortion of eﬃciency caused by direct subsidies is visible
in our plots for Spain and Germany, especially for pig farms, see below.
The less environmentally friendly farms are generally more eﬃcient in terms of the actual
price structure. This holds regardless of whether direct subsidies are included in the cal-





































Figure 1: German cattle farms 2000, EW. Left: gW(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from equation (2)
where lower left axis is the impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right: gW with
ESU ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5% quantile


































































, EDP. Left: gDP(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from equation
(2) where lower left axis is impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right: gDP with
ESU ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5% quantile
i.e. small farms (dashed line). Outer 2% are cut oﬀ in both ﬁgures.
livestock units per agricultural utilized area increase (under the actual price structure of
inputs and outputs). Environmentally friendly pig farms are the exception. When we in-
clude direct payments (i.e. consider EDP) they indeed show a high level of eﬃciency. These
ﬁndings are especially strong in the medium and small holdings, in particular in Germany,
but can also be found in Spain.
Positive externalities justify the introduction of subsidies to reward nature conservation.
The target of helping to preserve the environment and increase eﬃciency was introduced by
the MacSharry reform of the CAP by linking subsidies to environmentally friendly farms.


































Figure 3: Spanish cattle farms 2000, EW. Left: gW(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from equation (2)
where lower left axis is impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right: gW with ESU
ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5% quantile i.e. small


































































, EDP. Left: gDP(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from equation
(2) where lower left axis is impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right: gDP with
ESU ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5% quantile
i.e. small farms (dashed line). Outer 2% are cut oﬀ in both ﬁgures.
in the sector of pig farming.
The eﬃciency level of the more environmentally friendly pig farms is much higher than
those of the conventional hog holdings, i.e. intensive ones, when focusing on EDP, again, es-
pecially in Germany. It is rather interesting to note that they lose their eﬃciency advantage
compared to the less environmentally adapted farms when we recalculate eﬃciency under
the counterfactual hypothesis of no direct payments. In other words, it is pretty clear that
the most environmentally friendly pig farms are eﬃcient thanks to direct payments of the
European Community.



































Figure 5: German pig farms 2000, EW. Left: gW(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from equation (2)
where lower left axis is impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right: gW with ESU
ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5% quantile i.e. small































































, EDP. Left: gDP(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from equation (2)
where lower left axis is impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right: gDP with ESU
ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5% quantile i.e. small
farms (dashed line). Outer 2% are cut oﬀ in both ﬁgures.
adapted to the environment. In this sector, the results hold true with and without direct
payments, i.e. independently of whether looking at EDP or EW. This also holds for both
countries, Germany and Spain.
However, in Germany, the discrepancy in eﬃciency between intensive and extensive animal
farming becomes less important when subsidies are taken into account, whereas in Spain we
cannot ﬁnd any eﬀect of the subsidies with respect to environmental friendliness in the cattle
sector. Our results seem to indicate that to some extent (and certain in Germany) there is
a positive distortion caused by subsidies for environmental friendliness. Moreover, we found




































Figure 7: Spanish pig farms 2000, EW. Left: gW(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from equation (2)
where lower left axis is impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right: gW with ESU
ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5% quantile i.e. small





























































, EDP. Left: gDP(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from equation (2)
where lower left axis is impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right: gDP with ESU
ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5% quantile i.e. small
farms (dashed line). Outer 2% are cut oﬀ in both ﬁgures.
in all types of farms studied in Germany but only for pig farming in Spain, (see Tables 5 to
9). Taken together, this information oﬀers the conclusion that the present direct subsidy
structure plays a signiﬁcant role in helping farms to preserve the natural environment under
competitive conditions. Additionally, the new CAP MTR could improve the eﬃciency of
the environmentally friendly farm by increasing the incentives for ecological farming.
To further investigate this point we directly calculated diﬀerent correlations between sub-
sidies and EF and tested them for signiﬁcance, see Tables 5 to 9. These results show a
signiﬁcant positive correlation of the direct subsidies and the proxy of adaptation to the




































Figure 9: Spanish sheep and goat farms 2000, EW. Left: gW(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from
equation (2) where lower left axis is impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right:
gW with ESU ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5%
quantile i.e. small farms (dashed line). Outer 2% are cut oﬀ in both ﬁgures.







































































,EDP. Left: gDP(ln(EF);ln(ESU)) from
equation (2) where lower left axis impact of ln(EF), lower right of ln(ESU). Right: gDP
with ESU ﬁxed at median (solid), 95% quantile i.e. large farms (dotted line), and 5%
quantile i.e. small farms (dashed line). Outer 2% are cut oﬀ in both ﬁgures.
countries and years over all models considered.
All ﬁgures indicate clearly that economic size matters for eﬃciency performance. Usually,
one would expect that larger farms outperform the smaller ones, but we found several
exceptions. Particularly, the smaller pig farms perform rather well and are competitive as
well.
Also the counterfactual exercise (looking on EW) without subsides supports these results
both in Germany and Spain. We cannot make such a clear statement for cattle farming.
Nevertheless, in Spain the small cattle farms are above the mean eﬃciency index. The
counterfactual study without direct subsidies upholds these result. This ﬁnding is interesting
22since this result ﬁts perfectly with the conclusions of ´ Alvarez and Arias (2003), who pointed
out that increasing cattle farm size while holding managerial ability constant can be an
important source for diseconomies of size.
In general the biggest farms reach the highest levels of eﬃciency for all animal types.
This result also holds true in the counterfactual exercise, except for German pig farming.
It is important to add here that the size impact on eﬃciency often interacts with the
environmental behavior, and that this impact (i.e. the one of ln(EF)) on eﬃciency is often
much stronger than the size eﬀect. The counterfactual does not seems to have an impact
on the eﬃciency of the small farms versus the medium farm.
German pig farming is an interesting case because the small environmentally friendly farms
become more eﬃcient than the biggest farm when we account for direct payments. But
this is not the case in either German cattle farming or for any type of animal farm in
Spain. There, direct payments do not seem to positively discriminate (helping to raise
relative eﬃciency) by size and adaptation to natural environment. Again, especially for pig
farming in Spain, small intensive farms seem to be above the mean eﬃciency index and
above the biggest farms. The counterfactual ignoring the subsidies when calculating the
eﬃciency upholds these results as well. This was a remarkable diﬀerence in the results of
German pig farming, where the direct payments made the environmentally friendly farms
more eﬃcient in comparison with the more conventional farms (intensive). In Germany, the
direct payment unambiguously increases the eﬃciency of environmentally friendly farms
when compared with conventional (intensive) ones, which is not the case in Spain.
We ﬁnally address the question of which factors the subsidies are correlated to and how
strongly. As we are interested in both absolute and relative mean increases, we calculated
all the following correlations and their p ¡ values:
corr(DP;EF); corr(DP;ln(EF)); corr(ln(1 + DP);ln(EF)); corr(ln(1 + DP);EF)
corr(DP;ESU); corr(DP;ln(ESU));
corr(ln(1 + DP);ln(ESU)); corr(ln(1 + DP);ESU)
corr(DP;EW); corr(ln(1 + DP);EW); corr(DP;EDP); corr(ln(1 + DP);EDP)
It is clear that when eﬃciency is calculated including DP, EDP will be (positively) correlated
with it; the result can change when looking on ln(1 + DP). Further, we expect that the
subsidies for each year are highly correlated with those of the last year. This means that,
when calculating EW, one has certainly not eliminated the eﬀect of all subsidies paid to
this farm, but only ignored the cash received this very year. So, in EW the long-term
eﬀect of (former received or not received) direct payments is still reﬂected. For this reason
it is clear that we are more interested in corr(DP;EW); corr(ln(1 + DP);EW) than in
corr(DP;EDP); corr(ln(1 + DP);EDP).
Again, ﬁrst we give the results for Spain for 1999 and 2000, drawn in Table 5 to Table 7.
First, let us brieﬂy summarize the signs we see in the tables: In both years, 1999 and
2000, signs are always negative for any correlation considered between DP and EF for
Spain as well as for Germany. This means that, as mentioned above, environmentally
friendly behavior is indeed supported ﬁnancially by the European Community (recall that
23Cattle
year variables (¢);(¢) (¢);ln(¢) ln(1 + ¢);(¢) ln(1 + ¢);ln(¢)
1999 DP;EF -.1267 -.4134 -.3864 -.1854
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;ESU 0.6567 0.4884 0.1369 0.2255
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;EW 0.0108 – 0.1099 –
0.6827 – 0.0000 –
DP;EDP 0.2007 – 0.1592 –
0.0000 – 0.0000 –
2000 DP;EF -.1808 -.4311 -.3264 -.1956
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;ESU 0.6163 0.4573 0.1061 0.1644
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;EW 0.1351 – 0.0897 –
0.0000 – 0.0004 –
DP;EDP 0.2755 – 0.1330 –
0.0000 – 0.0000 –
Table 5: Correlations (upper lines) with p-values for signiﬁcance (lower lines) for Spain.
Pig Farming
year variables (¢);(¢) (¢);ln(¢) ln(1 + ¢);(¢) ln(1 + ¢);ln(¢)
1999 DP;EF -.0893 -.2574 -.4323 -.1306
0.1549 0.0000 0.0000 0.0372
DP;ESU 0.4885 0.3425 0.1834 0.1188
0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0581
DP;EW -.0529 – -.3088 –
0.4005 – 0.0000 –
DP;EDP 0.1252 – -.1852 –
0.0458 – 0.0030 –
2000 DP;EF -.1427 -.4211 -.4718 -.3836
0.0243 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;ESU 0.1682 0.2106 0.0464 0.0284
0.0078 0.0008 0.4661 0.6553
DP;EW -.1462 – -.2370 –
0.0210 – 0.0002 –
DP;EDP 0.0580 – -.1355 –
0.3622 – 0.0326 –
Table 6: Correlations (upper lines) with p-values for signiﬁcance (lower lines) for Spain.
24Sheep and Goats
year variables (¢);(¢) (¢);ln(¢) ln(1 + ¢);(¢) ln(1 + ¢);ln(¢)
1999 DP;EF -.0817 -.2722 -.2705 -.1269
0.0548 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028
DP;ESU 0.9683 0.6143 0.8555 0.5959
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;EW 0.0480 – -.2046 –
0.2594 – 0.0000 –
DP;EDP 0.1136 – -.0638 –
0.0075 – 0.1341 –
2000 DP;EF -.0862 -.2845 -.2750 -.1298
0.0247 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007
DP;ESU 0.9731 0.6248 0.8297 0.5706
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;EW 0.0917 – -.0956 –
0.0168 – 0.0127 –
DP;EDP 0.1516 – 0.0241 –
0.0000 – 0.5302 –
Table 7: Correlations (upper lines) with p-values for signiﬁcance (lower lines) for Spain.
Cattle
year variables (¢);(¢) (¢);ln(¢) ln(1 + ¢);(¢) ln(1 + ¢);ln(¢)
1999 DP;EF -.0914 -.1102 -.1686 -.1432
0.0248 0.0067 0.0000 0.0004
DP;ESU 0.9705 0.6109 0.6085 0.4422
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;EW 0.0762 – -.1909 –
0.0612 – 0.0000 –
DP;EDP 0.1168 – 0.0142 –
0.0040 – 0.7275 –
2000 DP;EF -.0633 -.0746 -.1398 -.1102
0.1201 0.0671 0.0006 0.0067
DP;ESU 0.9695 0.5994 0.6128 0.4480
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;EW 0.1002 – -.1075 –
0.0138 – 0.0082 –
DP;EDP 0.1200 – 0.0085 –
0.0031 – 0.8356 –
Table 8: Correlations (upper lines) with p-values for signiﬁcance (lower lines) for Germany.
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year variables (¢);(¢) (¢);ln(¢) ln(1 + ¢);(¢) ln(1 + ¢);ln(¢)
1999 DP;EF -.2678 -.3708 -.4654 -.4130
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;ESU 0.9699 0.8309 0.7181 0.6435
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;EW 0.2451 – 0.0324 –
0.0000 – 0.5426 –
DP;EDP 0.2823 – 0.1816 –
0.0000 – 0.0006 –
2000 DP;EF -.2692 -.3541 -.4525 -.4199
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;ESU 0.9595 0.8268 0.7232 0.6547
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DP;EW 0.2796 – 0.0473 –
0.0000 – 0.3746 –
DP;EDP 0.2923 – 0.1153 –
0.0000 – 0.0298 –
Table 9: Correlations (upper lines) with p-values for signiﬁcance (lower lines) for Germany.
the smaller the EF the more environmentally friendly the farm is). For both countries
and years all correlations considered between DP and ESU are positive. This means that
large farms generally get more ﬁnancial support than small ones. Looking at the pair
corr(DP;EW), corr(ln(1 + DP);EW) we get the following schema for both years
cattle pig sheep and goats
Spain + + – – + –
Germany + – + 0
Now let us come to a more detailed analysis of the results:
Looking only at the absolute values of the calculated correlation coeﬃcients, it seems evident
(compare the p-values of the signiﬁcance tests) that the distortion of eﬃciency caused by
direct subsidies is signiﬁcant in Spain and Germany. But do not forget that here we are
not correcting for endogeneity. That is why we had to do the regression analysis with the
counterfactual exercise.
Direct payment correlation with farm size shows the level of real inverse modulation of the
actual CAP subsidies. In Germany and Spain we found a clear positive correlation between
subsidies and farm size. Our results are not surprising in the sense that some DP are directly
related to “size”, e.g. payments per animal. However, they are deﬁnitely surprising when
we compare the oﬃcial political intention with the high level of correlation. Often, the
correlation between DP and size is higher than 90%, i.e. subsidies can mainly be explained
26by farm size. Moreover, results are independent of farm type, country or the year in which
they are tested. These results are congruent with the generally believed hypothesis that all
direct subsidies are (indirectly) linked mostly to output level and size.
Looking at the correlations between EDP and DP, the results are, as expected, all positive
or zero except corr(ln(1 + DP);EDP) for pig farming in Spain. There is certainly no
doubt that when direct payment enters as positive output or negative input of a farm,
then farms obtaining those payments seem to be eﬃcient. Looking at the p-values this is
signiﬁcant for most cases in both countries and years. The hypothesis that subsidies really
increase economic eﬃciency has to be examined by comparing the real eﬃciency DEA index
with counterfactual eﬃciencies under the hypothesis of not having received subsidies in the
particular year.
Then, in this more interesting counterfactual exercise, our results show that the level of
eﬃciency on average increases with the units of direct payments as well. This again with
the exception of Spanish pig farms. However, looking at a percentage increase of direct
payment, i.e. on corr(ln(1 + DP);EW), eﬃciency decreases or stagnates for all years and
countries except for Spanish cattle farms. In other words, focusing on the eﬃciency, a policy
which grants subsidies per farm seems much more reasonable than the current (and thus
counterproductive) policy of giving subsidies mainly based on size. This is also one of the
key points in the recommendation list of Bertola et al. (2002), reinforced by our empirical
results. In fact a subsidy per agricultural worker is less discriminatory than the actual
system (see Mora and San Juan, 2004).
As indicated above, when we interpreted the graph’s outcomes, the results show signiﬁcant
positive correlation between the direct subsidies and the proxy of adaptation to the natural
environment, e.g. direct payments correlated negatively with LU/UAA. That is, we found
an overall signiﬁcant decreasing level of direct payments as the livestock units per agricul-
tural utilized area increased in all farm types. So the subsidy policy takes environmental
friendliness into account. However, it is evident from the tables that this correlation is
much weaker, almost negligible compared to the overwhelmingly strong correlation between
subsidies and farm size.
5 Conclusions
The main empirical conclusions are the following.
Maybe not surprisingly, looking at conventional eﬃciency (EW), large farms with intensive
holdings are generally more eﬃcient. Direct payments are a potential source of eﬃciency
distortions. In fact, the amount of direct payment growth after the CAP reform of 1992
signiﬁcantly aﬀects the relative level of eﬃciency EDP. The results show a positive corre-
lation between subsidies and eﬃciency (both EW and EDP) when looking at the absolute
amounts. However, the mean eﬃciency decreases or stagnates as the percentage of direct
payments rises. This holds for all type of farms, years and countries analyzed except for
Spanish cattle farms. This means that a combination of direct subsidies and size is counter-
productive. Unfortunately, our results show clearly that this is what the present subvention
27policy is doing: farm size explains about 90% (or more) of the direct payments.
Note further that the strong subsidization of large farms cannot be justiﬁed with their
presumably high eﬃciency or environmental friendliness. Neither our graphical nor our
numerical results conﬁrm, or even contradict, such a hypothesis.
The direct subsidies have been justiﬁed as a reward for the positive externalities that the
agricultural activities generate. We have found that the current direct payment system
is not suﬃcient to correct the fact that the less environmentally friendly farms are the
most eﬃcient ones. The only exception we found was German pig farming in which the
eﬃciency of the most environmentally friendly farms normally rises strongly with direct
payments versus the counterfactual exercise. This eﬀect is more important in Germany,
where conventional farms become less eﬃcient than the environmentally friendly farms after
receiving direct payments. In Spain, the most conventional (intensive) Spanish hog holdings
reach eﬃciency levels “similar” to the environmentally friendly farms when accounting for
direct payments (or vice versa). But the smallest and less environmentally adapted farms
are most eﬃcient. Given that the CAP regulations are common for the whole EU, we guess
that the diﬀerences in the environmental standards and their enforcements between Member
States have lead ﬁnally to the observed diﬀerences between Germany and Spain.
Nevertheless, together with the numerical results on correlations, we conclude that there
is some empirical evidence that the actual direct payments system is “environmentally ori-
ented” for all types of farms studied (decreasing level of direct payments as the livestock
units per agricultural utilized area increases). Thus, our calculations show that the actual
subsidy schedule plays a signiﬁcant role in helping farmers to conserve the natural envi-
ronment, even though we have seen throughout our data that while this policy succeeds in
particular in Germany, it is still not suﬃcient to motivate farmers to change their production
towards a more environmental friendly one.
All this should encourage a look at what the EU is doing to change the actual situation
(the cross-compliance target on the CAP reform 2003) in the future.
6 Appendix
All histograms shown here refer to the Spanish data. We ﬁrst give the histogram plots
for 1999, EDP and EW, followed by those for 2000. Note that these indices are calculated
based on an input orientated DEA. Due to the high level of disaggregation, see discussion
in the previous sections, we have in most cases the mode at 1 but little density close to 1. A
further aggregation of inputs would make the histograms ﬂatter on the right tail. Obviously,
there are only marginal diﬀerences between 1999 and 2000.
Finally, we give histograms for 1999 and 2000 of the diﬀerences in EDP when calculated
by input orientated DEA minus those calculated by output orientated DEA (“orientation
diﬀerences for EDP”). As expected, the diﬀerences have by far the most density close to
zero. Together with the former plots (EDP in 1999 and 2000) we can already conclude that
these small changes cannot aﬀect the all over conclusions of our analysis.
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